Teaching Inverse Reinforcement Learners via Features and Demonstrations

Learning near-optimal behaviour from an expert's demonstrations typically relies on the assumption that the learner knows the features that the true reward function depends on. In this paper, we study the problem of learning from demonstrations in the setting where this is not the case, i.e., where there is a mismatch between the worldviews of the learner and the expert. We introduce a natural quantity, the teaching risk, which measures the potential suboptimality of policies that look optimal to the learner in this setting. We show that bounds on the teaching risk guarantee that the learner is able to find a near-optimal policy using standard algorithms based on inverse reinforcement learning. Based on these findings, we suggest a teaching scheme in which the expert can decrease the teaching risk by updating the learner's worldview, and thus ultimately enable her to find a near-optimal policy.Comment: NeurIPS'2018 (extended version

Noisy Submodular Maximization via Adaptive Sampling with Applications to Crowdsourced Image Collection Summarization

We address the problem of maximizing an unknown submodular function that can only be accessed via noisy evaluations. Our work is motivated by the task of summarizing content, e.g., image collections, by leveraging users' feedback in form of clicks or ratings. For summarization tasks with the goal of maximizing coverage and diversity, submodular set functions are a natural choice. When the underlying submodular function is unknown, users' feedback can provide noisy evaluations of the function that we seek to maximize. We provide a generic algorithm -- \submM{} -- for maximizing an unknown submodular function under cardinality constraints. This algorithm makes use of a novel exploration module -- \blbox{} -- that proposes good elements based on adaptively sampling noisy function evaluations. \blbox{} is able to accommodate different kinds of observation models such as value queries and pairwise comparisons. We provide PAC-style guarantees on the quality and sampling cost of the solution obtained by \submM{}. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in an interactive, crowdsourced image collection summarization application.Comment: Extended version of AAAI'16 pape

Stochastic Privacy

Online services such as web search and e-commerce applications typically rely on the collection of data about users, including details of their activities on the web. Such personal data is used to enhance the quality of service via personalization of content and to maximize revenues via better targeting of advertisements and deeper engagement of users on sites. To date, service providers have largely followed the approach of either requiring or requesting consent for opting-in to share their data. Users may be willing to share private information in return for better quality of service or for incentives, or in return for assurances about the nature and extend of the logging of data. We introduce \emph{stochastic privacy}, a new approach to privacy centering on a simple concept: A guarantee is provided to users about the upper-bound on the probability that their personal data will be used. Such a probability, which we refer to as \emph{privacy risk}, can be assessed by users as a preference or communicated as a policy by a service provider. Service providers can work to personalize and to optimize revenues in accordance with preferences about privacy risk. We present procedures, proofs, and an overall system for maximizing the quality of services, while respecting bounds on allowable or communicated privacy risk. We demonstrate the methodology with a case study and evaluation of the procedures applied to web search personalization. We show how we can achieve near-optimal utility of accessing information with provable guarantees on the probability of sharing data

Information Gathering with Peers: Submodular Optimization with Peer-Prediction Constraints

We study a problem of optimal information gathering from multiple data providers that need to be incentivized to provide accurate information. This problem arises in many real world applications that rely on crowdsourced data sets, but where the process of obtaining data is costly. A notable example of such a scenario is crowd sensing. To this end, we formulate the problem of optimal information gathering as maximization of a submodular function under a budget constraint, where the budget represents the total expected payment to data providers. Contrary to the existing approaches, we base our payments on incentives for accuracy and truthfulness, in particular, {\em peer-prediction} methods that score each of the selected data providers against its best peer, while ensuring that the minimum expected payment is above a given threshold. We first show that the problem at hand is hard to approximate within a constant factor that is not dependent on the properties of the payment function. However, for given topological and analytical properties of the instance, we construct two greedy algorithms, respectively called PPCGreedy and PPCGreedyIter, and establish theoretical bounds on their performance w.r.t. the optimal solution. Finally, we evaluate our methods using a realistic crowd sensing testbed.Comment: Longer version of AAAI'18 pape

Interactive Teaching Algorithms for Inverse Reinforcement Learning

We study the problem of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) with the added twist that the learner is assisted by a helpful teacher. More formally, we tackle the following algorithmic question: How could a teacher provide an informative sequence of demonstrations to an IRL learner to speed up the learning process? We present an interactive teaching framework where a teacher adaptively chooses the next demonstration based on learner's current policy. In particular, we design teaching algorithms for two concrete settings: an omniscient setting where a teacher has full knowledge about the learner's dynamics and a blackbox setting where the teacher has minimal knowledge. Then, we study a sequential variant of the popular MCE-IRL learner and prove convergence guarantees of our teaching algorithm in the omniscient setting. Extensive experiments with a car driving simulator environment show that the learning progress can be speeded up drastically as compared to an uninformative teacher.Comment: IJCAI'19 paper (extended version

Learning User Preferences to Incentivize Exploration in the Sharing Economy

We study platforms in the sharing economy and discuss the need for incentivizing users to explore options that otherwise would not be chosen. For instance, rental platforms such as Airbnb typically rely on customer reviews to provide users with relevant information about different options. Yet, often a large fraction of options does not have any reviews available. Such options are frequently neglected as viable choices, and in turn are unlikely to be evaluated, creating a vicious cycle. Platforms can engage users to deviate from their preferred choice by offering monetary incentives for choosing a different option instead. To efficiently learn the optimal incentives to offer, we consider structural information in user preferences and introduce a novel algorithm - Coordinated Online Learning (CoOL) - for learning with structural information modeled as convex constraints. We provide formal guarantees on the performance of our algorithm and test the viability of our approach in a user study with data of apartments on Airbnb. Our findings suggest that our approach is well-suited to learn appropriate incentives and increase exploration on the investigated platform.Comment: Longer version of AAAI'18 paper. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1702.0284